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THE NOT SO GREAT WRIT: THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FINDS HABEAS
CORPUS AN INADEQUATE REMEDY: SHOULD
AMERICAN COURTS REEXAMINE THE WRIT?
Allen E. Shoenberger+
Only two English writs of action are mentioned in the text of the
United States Constitution. One, the Great Writ-the writ of habeas
corpus-is guarded, except in times of rebellion or invasion when the
public safety requires it.' The other writ, the Bill of Attainder, is prohib-
ited.2 The latter writ was consigned to the dustbin of history, as a remedy
whose time had passed. Recent decisions of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights concerning the limitations of the English writ of habeas cor-
pus suggest a need for reconsideration and revamping of federal habeas
corpus, else it too should be considered outmoded and consigned to the
dustbin. The European court has found several deficiencies in the origi-
nal writ on which the American writ is based. The federal writ of habeas
corpus exemplifies to an even greater extent some of the deficiencies
found in the English writ.
The English writ of habeas corpus protected persons against illegiti-
mate confinement by the government. The writ of habeas corpus was
described by Blackstone as, "the most celebrated writ in the English
law. '' 3 Justice Brennan described the writ of habeas corpus as follows:
It is "a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into
the genius of our common law.... It is perhaps the most impor-
tant writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as
it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal re-
straint or confinement ......
+ Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law. J.D. Columbia
Law School, 1969, B.A. Swarthmore College, 1966.
1. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The First Judiciary Act conferred habeas corpus
jurisdiction upon the federal judiciary. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
2. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. There is also a brief reference to the Attainder of
Treason in Article III, Section 3: "[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the life of the Person attainted." U.S. CONST., art. III, §
3, cl. 2.
3. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *129.
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.. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government
must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's impris-
onment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with
the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to
his immediate release."
The English writ ran against both executive and judicial confinement.5
In the famous Bushell's Case,6 the court confined the jury when they re-
fused to return a verdict of guilty against William Penn and William
Mead on charges of tumultuous assembly and other crimes.7 The Court
of Common Pleas, in an opinion by Chief Justice Vaughan, ordered
Bushell released from custody.'
At English law, the writ not only reached issues involving jurisdiction,
but also reached matters such as the denial of due process. Once again,
"Bushell's Case is [directly] in point."9
Recent opinions of the European Court of Human Rights ° have on
numerous occasions found that the writ of habeas corpus is an inadequate
remedy for the protection of persons under the European Convention on
Human Rights.11 Since the European Convention on Human Rights is
grounded upon the fundamental rights contained in the United States
Constitution, including in particular, the Bill of Rights, 2 consideration of
this modern court's view of the means needed to protect human rights in
the modern world will illuminate domestic difficulties with the writ.
Moreover, since the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
determine law for forty-six countries (including the United Kingdom)
4. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,400, 402 (1963) (quoting Sec'y of State of Home Affairs
v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603,609 (H.L.).
5. Id. at 404-05.
6. (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.D.).
7. Id. at 1006-07.
8. Id. at 1017-18. Bushell was one of the jurors in the case. Id. at 1006; see also Noia,
372 U.S. at 403.
9. Noia, 372 U.S. at 404.
10. The European Court of Human Rights consists of judges from forty-five countries
in the Council of Europe. European Court of Human Rights, Organisation of the Court,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/the+court/the+court/organisation+of+the+cou
rt (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). For a more extensive description of this important judicial
body, see Allen Shoenberger, Messages from Strasbourg: Lessons for American Courts
from the Highest Volume Human Rights Court in the World- The European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 27 WHITrIER L. REv. 357,358-60 (2005).
11. The European Convention on Human Rights was originally adopted in 1950 by
countries that were then members of the Council of Europe. Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [here-
inafter European Convention on Human Rights]. The Council of Europe now consists of
forty-six countries, twenty-one of which are from Central and Eastern Europe. About the
Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/aboutcoe/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
12. Shoenberger, supra note 10, at 359-60.
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and 800 million people, issues are far more frequently decided first in this
tribunal than in the United States Supreme Court (a court that decides
only a tenth as many decisions on the merits annually, and only a few of
these decisions are "human rights" decisions).13
I. CONFINEMENT OF AN AUTISTIC ADULT: THE INABILITY TO REACH
THE CONTINUING MERITS OF CONFINEMENT
In H.L. v. United Kingdom,4 a mentally retarded, autistic adult, H.L.,"
was confined to a mental hospital without resort to British statutory pro-
cedures for the detention of persons dangerous to others or to them-
selves.'6 Since H.L. did not resist confinement (although he was incompe-
tent to consent to confinement), the doctors and staff responsible simply
confined him.17 The occasion for the confinement was agitation at a day-
care center where H.L. began "hitting himself on the head with his fists
and banging his head against the wall.' 8 When a sedative prescribed by a
doctor did not control the agitation, H.L. was taken to an emergency unit
at a hospital, and then after diagnosis, taken to the Intensive Behavioural
Unit of the hospital where he was confined from July 22 until December
5, 1997.19
Prior to his release, the applicant, through his cousin and "next friend,"
applied for judicial review of the decision to admit him, for a writ of ha-
beas corpus and damages based on a theory of false imprisonment.2 0 The
High Court rejected H.L.'s petition.2' On appeal, the Court of Appeal
found that "'the whole approach of the [hospital] in this case was based
on a false premise.... the belief that they were entitled to treat [the ap-
plicant] . . . as long as he did not dissent.' ' 22 In separate opinions, the
House of Lords allowed the appeal (i.e., reversed the Court of Appeal's
ruling), essentially on the ground that the tort of false imprisonment had
not been demonstrated.2
The European Court of Human Rights noted:
[T]he key factor in the.., case [was] that the health care profes-
sionals treating and managing the applicant exercised complete
13. Id. at 358-59.
14. 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 191.
15. H.L. could not speak, and "his level of understanding [was] limited." Id. at 198.
16. Id. at 199.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 199,201.
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id. at 203-04.
22. Id. at 204 (alterations in original). Nominal damages were awarded, and the
Court of Appeal "granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords." Id.
23. Id. at 205-06, 225-26.
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and effective control over [the applicant's] care and movements
from the moment [the applicant] presented acute behavioural
problems on 22 July 1997 to the date he was compulsorily de-
tained on 29 October 1997.24
The applicant was not free to leave, and "[a]ny suggestion to the con-
trary was, in the Court's view, fairly described by [British] Lord Steyn as
'stretching credulity to breaking point' and as a 'fairy tale."'5 Thus, the
European court determined that the applicant was deprived of his liberty
within the meaning of the Convention.
The Court of Human Rights then went on to determine whether the
detention was lawful within the meaning of the Convention. The court
found that the requirements for deprivation for unsoundness of mind
were satisfied in the instant case with respect to the initial confinement
considering the margin of appreciation accorded to the national authori-
ties under the Convention. 26 The court then determined that under the
then-developing law of necessity in Great Britain, the detention was
27
proper.
However, the court also determined that "the further element of law-
fulness, the aim of avoiding arbitrariness, ha[d] not been satisfied."2 The
court found "striking the lack of any fixed procedural rules by which
[such] admission and detention" should be considered. In particular,
"[t]here [was] no requirement to [establish] the exact purpose of the ad-
mission (for example, for assessment or for treatment) and, consistently,
no limits in terms of time, treatment or care attach [sic] to that admission.
... Nor [was] there any specific provision requiring a continuing clinical
assessment" of the detained person.30 No person was entitled to repre-
sent the detained person as under the civil involuntary detention proce-
dures in the United Kingdom.
Although the court did not doubt the good faith of the hospital person-
nel, it found that the failure to include such procedural protections consti-
tuted an arbitrary deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Con-
vention.2
The court then went on to consider whether the available legal reme-
dies in the United Kingdom, including habeas corpus, complied with the
requirements of the Convention under article 5, section 4, which requires
24. Id. at 226.
25. Id at 227.
26. Id. at 229-30.
27. Id. at 233-35.
28. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 236.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 236-37.
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that procedures exist whereby "'the lawfulness of [a] detention shall be
decided speedily by a court."' 3  The court concluded that no existing
remedy, including habeas corpus, did so. 4 The court relied upon its ear-
lier decision in Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom,35 wherein it found that
judicial review in the United Kingdom did not constitute an effective
remedy because the reviewing court was precluded from considering the
underlying merits of the issues posed.36 In particular, the court in H.L.
found that the available remedies established the "bar of unreasonable-
ness ... so high as effectively to exclude any adequate examination of the
merits of the clinical views as to the persistence of mental illness justify-
ing detention., 37 The merits of the continuing detention were simply be-
yond the scope of judicial review in the United Kingdom, and that was an
inadequate remedy according to the court.38 The possibility of a civil
claim for damages was insufficient, as was the possibility of a declaratory
judgment action.39
In short, the United Kingdom's writ of habeas corpus, as understood by
the European Court of Human Rights, neither permitted examination of
the procedural lacunae in English law, nor the underlying merits of
whether confinement continued to be justified.
Would the scope of habeas corpus be any different in the United States
from that in the United Kingdom? The answer appears pretty squarely
to be no. Under the writ as currently administered in United States fed-
eral courts, for example, only some constitutional errors are cognizable in
the first case,40 not mere procedural errors, and the underlying merits of
the reason for detention are ordinarily beyond the competence of the
reviewing court. Instead, a strong presumptive validity is to be accorded
the initial determinations, be they state or federal. Moreover, the focus of
the writ in American courts today is the legitimacy of the original reason
for confinement (present in H.L.) and not any continuing justification for
confinement.
41
33. Id. at 237 (quoting European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11, art. 5,
§ 4).
34. Id. at 237-39.
35. 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 45.
36. H.L., 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 240-41.
37. Id. at 241.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 241-42. No cases were cited in which a U.K. court accepted that a serious
justiciable issue was presented as in the case at bar, and in which there was no allegation of
negligence (precluding a civil claim for damages). Id.
40. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1975) (holding that Fourth Amendment
claims are not cognizable at all in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
41. Cf. H.L., 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 228-30.
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II. CONFINEMENT OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: INABILITY TO REACH
THE MERITS OF RECONFINEMENT
In its earlier decision of X v. United Kingdom,42 the European Court of
Human Rights similarly held that the writ of habeas corpus was inade-
quately narrow under the European Convention of Human Rights to
challenge the lawfulness of continued detention of a person detained on
grounds of criminal insanity.43 The particular confinement at issue was
the recall to Broadmoor Hospital of a person originally confined for an
offense of "wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm."44
The European Court of Human Rights had no difficulty in determining
that the emergency recall procedures were themselves permissible in that
they were in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, and were
thus "'lawful' in the sense of being in conformity with... domestic law.,
45
However, the reviewing tribunal must, to some extent, be permitted to
decide the merits of the continued detention, not just the technical "law-
fulness" in the sense of compliance with procedural substance.
In X v. United Kingdom, the government of the United Kingdom ar-
gued that habeas corpus provided an adequate remedy permitting the
lawfulness of the detention to be judicially determined.46 The European
court, however, finding that habeas relief did not permit a U.K. court to
consider "both the substantive and the formal lawfulness of [the] deten-
tion," held that habeas was an inadequate remedy in X's situation.47 All
that habeas permits is a formal review of the technical legality of the con-
finement, it does not go to "the grounds or merits of a decision taken by
an administrative authority."' Indeed, if discretion is available to the
administrative authority, a reviewing habeas court will only examine "the
conformity of the exercise of that discretion with the empowering stat-
ute. 4 9 To satisfy the European standard, however, the U.K. court would
have needed "to examine whether the patient's disorder still persisted
and whether the Home Secretary was entitled to think that a continua-
tion of the compulsory confinement was necessary in the interests of pub-
lic safety. ''5
42. 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1981).
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id. at 17.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 24-25.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 25.
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III. CONFINEMENT ON REMAND: EIGHT WEEK AND SEVENTEEN-DAY
DELAYS NOT "SPEEDY"-HABEAS AN INEFFECTIVE REMEDY
In a case originating in Malta, Sabeur Ben Al v. Malta,5 the Maltese
version of the writ of habeas corpus was found wanting for several rea-
sons.12 First, a gap of eight weeks between filing the writ and a decision
on the writ was "prima facie difficult to reconcile with the notion of
'speedily."' 53 Second, the court found that the habeas provision, which
was primarily aimed at punishing "officials who fail to attend to ... the
lawfulness of the detention, 54 had not been successfully utilized by de-
tained persons, making the remedy itself inadequate.5
A similar case from Malta, Kadem v. Malta, 6 dealing with detention for
potential extradition, similarly held that the Maltese version of a writ of
habeas corpus was inadequate for a speedy determination. 7 The court
again emphasized that the punishment of officials for failing to attend to
detention complaints was an inadequate remedy. In addition, given the
seventeen-day delay in rendering a decision, the court found that the law-
fulness of the action was not "decided speedily."59
51. App. No. 35892/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2000), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search "Application Number" for "35892/97").
52. Id. para. 53.
53. Id. para. 38. Article 5, section 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights
requires that "the lawfulness of [a] detention ... be decided speedily by a court and [a]
release ordered if the detention is not lawful." European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 11, art. 5, § 4.
54. Sabeur Ben Ali, para. 39. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, for example, provided
for a penalty of one hundred pounds forfeitable to the prisoner for the first offense, and
two hundred pounds for the second offense. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2
(Eng.).
55. See Sabeur Ben Ali, paras. 39-42. The original writ of habeas corpus in England
was enforced through a provision that imposed a significant fine upon an official who
failed to promptly justify the detention. See supra note 54.
56. App. No. 55263/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan 9, 2003), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search "Application Number" for "55263/00").
57. Id. para. 53.
58. Id. para. 52. The court awarded non-pecuniary damages of five thousand euro as
well as costs and expenses. Id. paras. 60, 64.
59. Id. paras. 44-45. It is thus unsurprising that the United Kingdom would not bother
to argue that the writ of habeas corpus was an adequate remedy when a patient committed
for psychiatric care could not be discharged for failure to comply with certain conditions
but it took over a year to render a decision mandating release. Kolanis v. United King-
dom, App. No. 517/02, paras. 75, 77 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 21, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.
int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search "Application Number" for "517/02"). Non-
pecuniary damages of six thousand euros were awarded along with costs and expenses. Id.
paras. 92, 95.
In a case dealing with detention of suspected terrorists, the court had determined that
even a four-day, six-hour delay in bringing a detainee before a judicial officer violated the
Convention's article 5, section 3 requirement of a prompt appearance. Brogan v. United
Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11, 33-34 (1988). However, the Court also held that
20061
Catholic University Law Review
Similarly, in Aquilina v. Malta,6° the failure to consider the bail applica-
tion of an accused until eleven days after arrest was held violative of the
Convention's requirement that issues of confinement be promptly sub-
61mitted to a competent judicial authority.
For comparison purposes, in early English law, a return to the writ of
habeas corpus was to be made within three days after service unless the
distance to the court was between twenty and one hundred miles, in
which case ten days were allowed, or if greater than one hundred miles,
then within twenty days.62 The custodian of a person had only six hours
after demand to deliver an official copy of the warrant of commitment
and detainer for a prisoner.63 Indeed, the court itself, including the lord
chancellor, lord keeper, any judge, or baron, was potentially liable to the
prisoner for five hundred pounds for denial of a required writ of habeas
64
corpus.
IV. SUMMARY OF INADEQUACIES OF THE WRIT AS FOUND BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In sum, the European Court of Human Rights has found several inade-
quacies in the writ of habeas corpus. The writ is too limited in nature
because it fails to include a method of measuring and limiting grounds for
civil commitment. Also, the writ fails to include review of the substantive
and formal merits of a detention decision. And, finally, the writ is inade-
quate because it fails to provide for a timely enough remedy.
V. WHY IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS INADEQUATE?
The English writ of habeas corpus was developed in a legal culture
without a written constitution. United States courts have often over-
looked this defining fact in the development of the writ. Once a written
constitution became effective in the United States, a completely new po-
tential application became possible, testing detention of the person based
upon consistency vel non with written constitutional norms.
the writ of habeas corpus would have been adequate to test this particular confinement if
the detainees employed it (which they did not). Id. at 34.
60. 1999-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 225.
61. Id. at 242-44. However, two days of detention prior to the first appearance before
a judicial officer was not inappropriate delay. Id. at 243. That magistrate had no authority
to order release of the detainee, and could ultimately only consider a narrow ground of
lawfulness, not the merits of the detention. Both limitations were violative of the Conven-
tion. No non-pecuniary damage was awarded, although costs and expenses were allowed.
Id. at 244-45.
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An identical problem is now presented with respect to the application
of the English writ (be it in the United Kingdom, Ireland, or Malta): the
writ may now be invoked as a potential remedy under the European
Convention on Human Rights, a document roughly analogous to the Bill
of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. The old aphorism that Britain has no
written constitution is no longer quite so true; it does, but only with re-
spect to human rights, and it is found in the European Convention.
The history of the writ of habeas corpus in the United States is com-
plex, but well discussed in many extensive articles and books, such as
those by James S. Liebman,6 Clarke D. Forsythe, 66 and William F.
Duker.67
Forsythe finds that the history of the writ limits its use as a post-
conviction remedy, for it was not used for that purpose at English law.
68
Forsythe insists that Professor Paul Freund, who "was appointed by the
Supreme Court in 1951 to argue United States v. Hayman .... countered
the previously unassailed (and since unchallenged) understanding that
habeas corpus was not available to convicted criminals under the English
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.
"
,69
Liebman would give the writ a broader scope under American post-
independence jurisprudence. His central thesis is that:
Federal habeas corpus is not a substitute for ... direct appeal as
of right. Since 1789, however, it has provided statutorily specified
classes of prisoners with a limited and substitute federal writ of er-
ror or appeal as of right. That appellate procedure has been lim-
ited because it has lain only to hear claims of particular national
importance -which Congress since 1867 has defined as all consti-
tutional claims. It has been a substitute because it has served only
in default of Supreme Court review as of right.
70
However, for Liebman, individual guilt determinations are not of na-
tional importance, and thus should not be a concern of habeas jurispru-
dence.7'
65. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992).
66. See, e.g., Clark D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Re-
view Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 (1995).
67. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS (1980).
68. Forsythe, supra note 66, at 1164.
69. Id.
70. Liebman, supra note 65, at 2055.
71. Id. at 2056 ("'Innocence claims' ... are both nationally unimportant.., and sub-
ject to little or no review because [review would be of] the central fact determination at
trial. For these reasons, the Court has been particularly careful to exclude such claims
from habeas corpus.").
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
Duker finds that history justifies the conclusion that the habeas writ
evolved under the post-Civil War legislation by Congress and interpreta-
tions by the Supreme Court:
The writ provided the courts with a forum for articulating societal
values. This was no new role for the writ. What was new was the
spokesman using the forum. Throughout the nineteenth century
it was generally the legislative department that employed habeas
to effect change in constitutional values. The substitution of pro-
cedural due process for substantive due process meant the use of
more discreet means by the judiciary for announcing constitu-
tional values.72
Whatever the merits of this disputation about the historical origin and
limits of the habeas writ, it is undisputed that today, in United States ju-
risprudence, the ambit of the writ has been greatly limited-some would
say to the virtual vanishing point. Much of that limitation came about
through curtailment of the writ by a steady drumbeat of limiting Supreme
Court decisions.73 The final cacophonous beat, however, may have been
administered not by the Supreme Court, but by Congress through enact-
ment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996.74
Among other provisions, AEDPA established a strict one-year statute
of limitations period for filing habeas corpus petitions.75 The statute was
enacted "in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing," partly as a con-
servative overreaction to assertions that prisoners were overusing the
habeas writ to delay sentence imposition, particularly death penalty deci-• 76
sions. The result is clear; the writ of habeas corpus is now, as a practical
72. DUKER, supra note 67, at 268-69.
73. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (allowing "habeas relief
based on trial error" only for "'actual prejudice'); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316
(1989) (limiting retroactive application of newly pronounced constitutional decisions).
74. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype"
and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 260-62 (2006) (suggesting that AEDPA did not
totally "gut" habeas corpus, failing to achieve the results that either its proponents envi-
sioned or its opponents feared, and stating that the major curtailment of the habeas writ is
left to the efforts of the Supreme Court).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000). The AEDPA also enacted stringent limitations on
successive petitions. Id. § 2244(b).
76. See Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an "Actual Innocence" Ex-
ception to AEDPA's Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 344-
46 & n.13 (2001-2002). The statute of limitations was made applicable to both state and
federal prisoners, supposedly because habeas litigation was employed for the purpose of
delay. Benjamin R. Orye, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, The Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final
for the Purposes of 28 U.S. C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441,455-56 (2002). As a
practical matter, since both state and federal prisoners who were serving time were already
serving their sentences, the delay argument had little application. Only potential death
[Vol. 56:47
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matter, virtually unavailable to most federal and state prisoners serving
substantial jail sentences.77 A window of a year does exist at some time
for all of these prisoners, but that window closes, and remains closed
from then on, regardless of such considerations such as actual innocence
or the degree of constitutional infringement. It matters not that such
important cases as Gideon v. Wainwright8 could no longer be brought
today. As Chief District Judge Bennett commented: "Judicial interpreta-
tion of the Great Writ during the past three decades has spun a cascading
web of confounding and labyrinthine procedural obstacles., 79 Finally,
Jake Sussman contends that "the creation of a statute of limitations for
federal petitions represents a straightforward attempt to curtail the tor-
tuous system already in place by cutting petitioners off at the pass." 8
The broadening of availability of the writ originally wrought by Fay v.
Noia,81 was curtailed by cases such as Stone v. Powell,82 Wainwright v.
penalty recipients would achieve anything through "delay." Id. at 456 n.110. Furthermore,
no evidence was provided to Congress that federal prisoners encountered any delay with
their federal habeas petitions. Id. at 456-57. Delay arguably did apply to much of the state
habeas litigation in federal courts, partly, but not solely, because of the unbelievably com-
plex nature of habeas corpus procedural rules-a labyrinth of rules, as Judge Bennett
labeled them. Id. at 455-57; Lee v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 1037, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bennett, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 534 U.S. 362 (2002). Representative Kastenmeier (D. Wis.) pointed
this out in a statement on the floor of the House, where he stated: "There is no evidence
that section 2255 motions are delayed in the current system. This new procedural cutoff is
simply not needed." 136 CONG. REC. 27,521 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
77. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996) (avoiding the issue of whether the
AEDPA constituted a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, by relying on the possibility
of an original habeas corpus action in the United States Supreme Court). Frankly, one is
more likely to encounter a dodo or a carrier pigeon than such a writ in actual practice
today.
78. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (establishing the right to an attorney, free if necessary, to
all persons accused of criminal offenses).
79. Kemna, 213 F.3d at 1048 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
80. Sussman, supra note 76, at 396.
81. 372 U.S. 391, 438-41 (1963).
82. 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (noting that evidence allegedly obtained in an uncon-
stitutional search is not a ground for federal habeas relief if there is a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issue in state court).
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
Sykes,8 Sumner v. Mata,8 Rose v. Lundy,85 Barefoot v. Estelle, 6 Teague v.
Lane,87 Lockhart v. Fretwell,' McCleskey v. Zant, 9 Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes,90 Duncan v. Henry,9' and Brecht v. Abrahamson.'
As a result, it is virtually impossible for a habeas petitioner, state or
federal, to obtain even a hearing on the merits, to say nothing about relief
83. 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (requiring that cause and prejudice be demonstrated
before a hearing may be held on an allegedly involuntary confession; as a result, federal
habeas review was barred).
84. 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (explaining that a "presumption of correctness" must be
accorded to state court determination of facts, even to a state appellate court determina-
tions of facts). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the pretrial
identification procedure employed by the state police was "'so impermissibly suggestive as
to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."' Id. at 543
(quoting Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1979)). The dissenting opinion by
Justice Brennan notes that the Supreme Court did not challenge the Court of Appeals'
finding on this issue. Id. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982) (holding that a mixed petition, containing both claims
exhausted in state court and claims not exhausted in state court, must be dismissed by the
federal court).
86. 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("When the process of direct review... comes to an end,
a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence."). Subse-
quent statutory modifications to § 2253 altered the matter subject to review on federal
habeas from "denial of [a] federal right," see id., at 893, to a "denial of a constitutional
right." See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).
87. 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (arguing that new rules of law, including constitutional
law rules, may not be applied retroactively except in very narrow situations in a habeas
petition).
88. 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (outlining the Court's test whereby "a criminal defendant
alleging prejudice must show 'that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable"' (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984))).
89. 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate cause and
prejudice for why a first federal habeas petition failed to include a claim before a second
petition may be heard on the merits).
90. 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (holding that cause and prejudice must be demonstrated by
defendant to "excuse [his] failure to develop material facts in state court"). The factual
issue in this case related to an alleged failure to properly translate into Spanish a nolo
contendere plea and its consequences. Id. at 3. The defendant asserted that he believed he
was agreeing to be tried for manslaughter, not that he was pleading no contest to man-
slaughter. Id.
91. 513 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the failure to
exhaust a federal constitutional claim in state court barred habeas review, even though the
same claim, phrased as a "miscarriage of justice" claim, was exhausted in state court).
92. 507 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1993) (holding that a constitutional error was found in the
state trial but the standard of whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on the jury verdict was not met, and holding that the test is no longer whether
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). This author represented the peti-
tioner in the Supreme Court and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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for a constitutional violation.93 The complexity of pleading, exhaustion,
and cause and prejudice requirements, in light of the requirement that
the prisoner prove a substantial and injurious effect from the constitu-
tional violation, are daunting hurdles, overcome by only the most fortu-
nate prisoners.
The European Court of Human Rights requires that claims be heard on
the merits by the reviewing courts, else the review is inadequate. For
virtually all habeas petitioners in United States courts today, that never
happens.94 Instead, such cases are short-circuited at an earlier stage by
procedural impediments.
The strongest indication of the rare vitality of the writ is demonstrated
by data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. From 1990 onward, annual district court filings of petitions for
habeas corpus relief are reported to have risen from 13,068 in fiscal year
1990 to 23,569 in fiscal year 2004.9' However, in the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2004 only three habeas cases were decided after a
trial, 0.1% of all habeas cases.96 By comparison, in the same judicial year,
3951 civil cases out of 197,743 civil cases were disposed of after trial.97
Moreover, proceedings in the United States woefully fail to comply
with the European Court of Human Rights' requirement of a prompt
submission to a court. Perhaps the best example of the tardy nature of
U.S. justice is exemplified by the underlying time frame of Fay v. Noia.
That case involved an arrest on May 11, 1941 . In 1955, the confessions
that were the basis of the original conviction were found to have been
extracted by beatings, and a co-defendant was ordered to be granted re-
lief under habeas.99 Habeas relief for Noia, however, was not accorded
until after the United States Supreme Court decision in 1963, more than
22 years after the initial detention.1' ° Noia, of course, would be precluded
93. See Blume, supra note 74, at 284 tbl.4. (reporting that the number of successful §
2254 cases in the United States courts of appeals from 1997 to 2004 was 321 out of 51,508
cases, or a success rate of 0.62%).
94. See supra notes 82-92.
95. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.4.6
(2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf. Two catego-
ries of habeas cases are reported separately. One category, "U.S. cases," reflects federal
prisoner habeas filings. The other, "private cases," reflects state prisoners filing habeas
petitions in federal courts. The figures reported combine these two categories.
96. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS
2004, at 156 tbl.C-4 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/contents.html [hereinafter
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2004].
97. Id. This amounts to approximately 2% of those disposed of by some court action.
Id.
98. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 300
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), affd, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
99. United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 699-701 (2d Cir. 1955).
100. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
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from raising his constitutional claim in any case today because of the one-
year statute of limitations in AEDPA.'°'
The federal rules governing the district courts' processing of federal
habeas (28 U.S.C. § 2255 cases) and state habeas (28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases)
do not command immediate attention, as required by the European
Court of Human Rights. For a § 2255 case, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 commands
that an order to show cause should be promptly issued (forthwith) and
"returned within three days unless for good cause shown additional time,
not exceeding twenty days, is allowed."'0 2 However, in the author's ex-
perience, months, rather than days, are likely consumed at this prelimi-
nary stage. Published data does not break out the time for processing
habeas cases versus other cases at the federal district court level. How-
ever, in 2004, 12.6% of all cases at the district court level had been pend-
ing for more than three years, and an additional 25% for longer than one
103
year.
For state habeas cases, however, the timetable provided for by rule is
not even as pressing as that for federal habeas. By rule, the court is to
examine a petition promptly and if the petition is not dismissed, the court
is to order a response within an unstated but fixed time.'m With the press
of other business before the district courts, habeas petitions are unlikely
to receive accelerated consideration.
For example, in one of the rare, recent cases in which the United States
Supreme Court found habeas relief appropriate, the habeas petition was
filed with the district court on August 8, 1999, and the district court first
granted relief on September 18, 2001, more than two years later.'05  The
decision was appealed, and after reversal at the court of appeals level,
relief was reinstated by a decision of June 26, 2003. '0 However, in the
same case, certiorari had previously been denied twice, first in 1992 and
then in 1999.07 The initial conviction under review was rendered by a
jury verdict on August 4, 1989, with a death sentence returned by the jury
on October 18, 1989. By the time habeas relief was reinstated, the de-
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
102. Id. § 2243.
103. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2004, supra note 96, at 165 tbl.C-6.
104. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4,
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 R. 4 (West Supp. 2006).
105. 1 Joint Appendix at 6, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 02-311).
106. Smith, 539 U.S. at 519. The district court's decision of September 19, 2001, Wig-
gins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2001), was reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2002).
107. See Wiggins v. Maryland, 528 U.S. 832 (1999); Wiggins v. Maryland, 503 U.S. 1007
(1992).
108. Smith, 539 U.S. at 515-16.
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fendant had lived for fourteen years on death row, and four years had
passed since the filing of the successful habeas petition9
A. Ongoing Confinement Limitations of the Writ
The American writ of habeas corpus, like the English writ, tests the
original confinement basis. It was not designed to deal with continuing
justifications for confinement such as in H.L. v. United Kingdom."° The
American writ is generally not available to test confinement allegedly
improper because newly available DNA testing would exculpate a con-
victed person."'
It is undisputed that DNA evidence has great potential utility in the
criminal justice system. As one author notes:
In sexual assault cases referred to the FBI in which DNA results
could be gathered, twenty-five percent of suspects had been ex-
cluded by forensic DNA testing every year since 1989. Addition-
ally, according to the National Institute of Justice, private labs
have noted about a twenty-six percent exclusion rate during the
112same time period.
However, it remains unclear whether DNA evidence will be a sufficient
basis for reopening a case on federal habeas. To be sure, in Herrera v.
Collins,"3 the Supreme Court assumed, but did not hold, that new evi-
dence might be so employed, but that assumption has not yet become
law." 4 Many hoped that the Supreme Court's decision in House v. Bell,"5
might clarify the matter. The decision, however, failed to resolve the
issue, for although the Court reversed and remanded for further proceed-
ings, the blood and DNA evidence was not itself dispositive, it was only a
factor in the Court's decision.1 6 The bottom line is that this important
legal issue remains undecided more than twelve years post-Herrera.
109. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
111. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b). The traditional method of raising new evidence is by
a motion for a new trial. Many states, however, impose a sixty-day time limit on making
such motions, and the federal courts impose a three-year limitation for new trial motions.
Id.; David DeFoore, Comment, Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for Justice from the
Wrongly Convicted, 33 TEX. TECH L. REv. 491,503 (2002).
112. DeFoore, supra note 111, at 493 (footnote omitted).
113. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
114. Id. at 417.
115. 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). The case had been before the Supreme Court two prior
times with certiorari denied each time. See House v. Tennessee, 517 U.S. 1193 (1996);
House v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 912 (1990). Mr. House has been on death row since 1987.
State v. House, 743 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tenn. 1987).
116. Bell, 126 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
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Prisoners are relegated to the possibility of a state enacting a special stat-
ute allowing DNA evidence to be secured and utilized.117
What about the application of habeas corpus to civil or quasi-civil
commitment situations? Federal habeas appears to be of marginal utility
in this context, for deference to state courts remains a linchpin of the fed-
eral habeas system. In Hubbart v. Knapp,"8 for example, a state prisoner
confined under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act was denied
federal relief under the application of AEDPA's requirement that the
state court's ruling be "'contrary to, or involve[] an unreasonable applica-
tion of,' clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
'" 119
In state courts, however, the writ has more potency. Delays, however,
are also frequent. For example, in Clarke v. Regier,120 release from cus-
tody was quite delayed. 121 In Clarke, the petitioner was originally invol-
untarily "committed... following his acquittal by reason of insanity for a
homicide he committed in 1978. '' 2 In December 2001, the director of
the facility in which Clarke was confined advised the court that Clarke
"no longer met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization."' 1 Lengthy
hearings ensued during which three physicians concurred that involun-
tary hospitalization was no longer needed. Clarke's release was or-
dered, but a mental health facility withdrew its participation in the plan,
and the court revoked its order.'25 Then, a year and a half passed. 26 De-
spite the unrebutted, stipulated opinions of each of the physicians, the
trial court ordered continued confinement in 2004.127 A writ of habeas
corpus was filed on June 25, 2004, and the District Court of Appeal of
Florida finally reversed with "directions to provide the petitioner with an
appropriate facility."'12 However, the decision stipulated that if the state
was unable to provide such a facility, habeas corpus would again be a
resort.
129
117. Legislative solutions appear to be necessary since habeas appears inadequate. As
a result, legislation has been introduced in Congress and in many states. DeFoore, supra
note 111, at 521. New York and Illinois were the only two states prior to 2000 to enact
post-conviction DNA testing legislation; by October 2001, twenty-one additional states had
passed laws, and fourteen states had pending legislation. Id. at 521-22.
118. 379 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1071 (2005).
119. Id. at 775,778.
120. 881 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).







128. Id. at 657-58.
129. Id. at 658.
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The writ was more effective in Georgia Mental Health Institute v.
Brady,'30 where a mental health facility refused to release an involuntarily
committed patient after an adverse decision on involuntary commit-
ment.3 3 The court concluded that "[t]o permit a facility to continue to
confine a patient after such a judicial finding would violate the patient's
right to due process.', 132 Moreover, in many state cases, the court reviews
the underlying facts to determine whether continued confinement is nec-
133essary.
Even in state courts, however, there may be gaps as well as delays in
habeas relief. For example, in M.W. v. Davis,13 4 the Florida Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS), acting as temporary guardian,
sought placement of a sixteen-year-old in a locked mental health facil-
ity.33 The child petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.136 A trial court
had ordered temporary placement in a locked mental facility pending an
evidentiary hearing. 37 This procedure was held to have been adequate
138under the due process requirements set forth in Parham v. J.R., al-
though in point of fact, more judicial process was accorded in M. W. than
in Parham.139 However, the M. W. court went on to hold that after accord-
ing temporary custody to the DCFS, the DCFS was entitled to exercise
the statutory rights of a parent to provide medical care, including psychi-
atric care.' ° While the court ordered rules to be developed to deal with
such cases, it appears from the court's ruling that habeas relief would
normally not be appropriate since such hospitalizations are voluntary. 4'
130. 436 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1993).
131. Id. at 220.
132. Id. at 223.
133. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Fla. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 633 So. 2d 1153, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that the only evidence of exercise of poor judgment was that "'inap-
propriate' sums of money" had been given to the Boy Scouts); In re B.B., 699 N.W.2d 686,
2005 WL 1225959, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2005) (unpublished table decision)
(finding that substantial evidence supported continued detention); Lindquist v. Bisch, 542
N.W.2d 138, 139, 141 (S.D. 1996) (finding that the appellant posed a danger to himself
supported by clear and convincing evidence).
134. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
135. Id. at 92, 94.
136. Id. at 95.
137. Id. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled for six weeks later. Id.
138. 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979); M.W., 756 So. 2d at 99. See generally Allen Edward
Shoenberger, "Voluntary" Commitment of Mentally Ill or Retarded Children: Child Abuse
by the Supreme Court, 7 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 (1981).
139. See infra note 141.
140. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 102-04.
141. See id. at 106 n.31, 107. The case went up to the Florida Supreme Court as a certi-
fied question from the district court of appeal. Id. at 92. The state supreme court held that
placement in a locked facility prior to an evidentiary hearing did not violate due process.
Id. at 99. In Parham v. J.R., no such hearing was ever required. Parham, 442 U.S. at 607-
08. The exercise of pure discretion by staff physicians of a mental hospital was acceptable
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In March 2003, the Florida Supreme Court finally issued a rule on psy-
chiatric and other residential commitments, providing that children are
entitled to be represented by an attorney to challenge commitment re-
quests.
142
Overall, however, the state writ of habeas corpus is apparently more
used and more effective than the federal writ. For example, in California,
Doe v. Gallinot4 reports that for the year 1975, 35% of the patients at
Camarillo State Hospital sought the writ and 6% were successful in ob-
taining review.M The court concluded that once mandated judicial re-
view is sought, a substantial number of patients are released.45 Statistics
for Los Angeles County for 1975 similarly reflect large numbers of re-
leases through the use of the writ, nearly 50% in 1975.14 More recent
data from California indicates a large number of habeas corpus cases.
Criminal habeas filings rose from 3944 in 1994-1995, to 5620 in 2003-
2004.47 In the same time frame, civil habeas corpus filings declined, from
5867 to 324 9.14 Unlike the virtual absence of hearings in federal courts
on habeas petitions, 1981 cases were disposed of after hearings in Cali-
fornia in fiscal year 2003-2004.49 Of these, 1104 were criminal habeas
cases and 877 were civil habeas cases."O More than 660 times as many
hearings or trials occurred in California state court alone than in the en-
tire federal court system in fiscal year 2004.151 Of course, disposition after
hearing of criminal habeas cases by non-Article III judges is not what the
Federal Constitution likely contemplated, but such state habeas reflects
to the United States Supreme Court. See id. Florida thus accords more process than the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires.
142. Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 842 So. 2d
763, 765-66 (Fla. 2003). The full text of Rule 8.350 is set forth in the appendix to the
court's opinion. Id. at 770-72. See generally Carolyn S. Salisbury, From Violence and Vic-
timization to Voice and Validation: Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Children's
Law Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 623,678 (2005).
143. 486 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
144. Id. at 989.
145. Id. In the following year, 80% sought judicial review by writ. Id. Ultimately,
50% were released, with 12% obtaining release through the writ itself. Id.
146. Id.
147. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2005 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE
CASELOAD TRENDS 56 tbl.11, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/
documents/csr2005.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 141 tbl.lle. Five thousand seven hundred and four habeas cases were dis-
posed of before a hearing; of the total number, 4843 were criminal habeas petitions and
2842 were civil habeas petitions. Id.
150. E-mail from Lynne Mayo, Office of Commc'ns, Judicial Council of Ca. to author
(Mar. 22,2006) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
151. Compare supra note 96 and accompanying text, with supra note 149 and accompa-
nying text.
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at least a potential for substantial relief. The federal writ is unlikely to
result in relief.
CONCLUSION
It is worthwhile to view the American legal system from the perspec-
tive of other legal systems; such viewing allows one to gain further per-
spectives. Not that foreign viewpoints are necessarily correct, but they
may encourage us to contemplate whether or not our rules and proce-
dures are more desirable. From such a viewpoint, the federal writ has
ceased to embody the guaranteed protection that the framers of the Con-
stitution and the First Congress envisaged for protecting federal rights
against state infringements. As Justice Story stated in Martin v. Hunter's
152Lessee,
15
The constitution has presumed ... that state attachments, state
prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes
obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the
regular administration of justice....
This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible
with the most sincere respect for state tribunals, might induce the
grant of appellate power over their [state court] decisions. That
motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of de-
cisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects
within the purview of the constitution. Judges of equal learning
and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a
statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution
itself: If there were no revising authority to control these jarring
and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity,
the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States
would be different in different states .... The public mischiefs
that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplor-
able, and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the
enlightened convention which formed the constitution."'
With all due respect to the Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence of
the last three decades, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
suggest it is time to reevaluate that jurisprudence, lest liberty and equality
suffer. The procedural hurdles that beset federal habeas should be re-
evaluated with an eye toward making the remedy an effective, available
remedy-particularly for prisoners who can make out credible cases that
serious constitutional error may taint their convictions, or when guilt is
seriously in doubt. Federal law should recognize the common sense pre-
sumption of most Americans that innocent persons should neither be
152. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
153. Id. at 347-48.
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executed nor incarcerated. Constitutional error should be grounds for
relief unless the error is truly harmless error.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court should reconsider this impor-
tant area. When a habeas corpus petitioner in federal court has a one in
eight thousand chance of receiving a trial on a habeas petition, but thir-
teen death row prisoners in Illinois were released from death row be-
cause they were proved innocent" 4 - it is imperative that American fed-eral habeas jurisprudence be reconsidered.
154. Elizabeth Brackett, Online NewsHour, Justice Reconsidered (Jan 13, 2003),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-juneO3/ryan l-13.html.old [hereinafter Justice
Reconsidered]. On January 11, 2003, outgoing Governor Ryan commuted the death sen-
tences of 156 remaining death row inmates. See Michael Sneed et al., Ryan to Commute all
Death Row Sentences, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A4. Gov. Ryan reasoned:
I have reviewed these cases on many occasions. And I, without a doubt, believe injus-
tice has occurred. I believe that these many are innocent, or I wouldn't have par-
doned them. I still have some faith in the system that eventually these men would
have received justice in our courts. But I believe the old adage is true: justice delayed
is justice denied.
Justice Reconsidered, supra.
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